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Shame on EU? Europe, RtoP, and the Politics of Refugee Protection 
Dan Bulley* 
 
In the early hours of Monday, April 4, 2016, over 130 people were deported from the Greek 
island of Lesbos on ships chartered by Frontex, the European Union’s border agency. Most 
were Pakistani or Bangladeshi, but Sri Lankans, Indians, Syrians, and one Iraqi were also on 
board. This was the first enactment of the deal struck between Turkey and the EU on March 
18, by which all new “irregular migrants” crossing from Turkey to Greece would be returned 
to Turkey as a “temporary and extraordinary measure.”1 As the two ferries left the docks in 
Lesbos, protestors roared their disapproval and raised banners with messages such as 
“Refugees Welcome” and “Shame on EU!”2 Amnesty International condemned the deal as 
the start of “Europe’s potentially disastrous undoing of its commitment to protect refugees,”3 
while Human Rights Watch warned that the deal threatens the rights of refugees and 
undermines the EU’s principles.4 In this burgeoning crisis, where European values and 
principles appear to have been abandoned or to offer little guidance for the EU’s actions, 
perhaps the emerging Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) norm offers the EU a route toward a 
more coherent and responsible policy.  
The EU has had something of an ambivalent relationship to RtoP, but it has been 
suggested that a proper engagement with this evolving norm has the potential to help EU 
states navigate their moral, political, and legal responsibilities with regard to refugees. As 
Jason Ralph and James Souter argue, RtoP’s concentration on the responsibility to assist and 
protect those suffering in Syria “surely implies guaranteeing a form of asylum” for those who 
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have fled to protect themselves.5 Ralph and Souter therefore suggest a potential evolution of 
the norm in this direction. For others, such an evolution is unnecessary, claiming that there 
would be “no easier way” for states to fulfill their RtoP than through the provision of 
asylum.6 In this article I argue against such a position for two reasons. First, the EU already 
proclaims a long list of values that it asserts both contributed to its founding and continues to 
guide its actions. Consequently, the addition of RtoP, which crucially contains no obligations 
to protect refugees in other territories, would add little. Second, when the logic underlying the 
EU’s and RtoP’s politics of protection is examined, a similarity emerges that would make 
such supplementation redundant. Although the EU is an apparently sui generis normative 
power, and though RtoP seems a substantial normative innovation in international society, 
what the refugee crisis reveals is that both are deeply conservative. The politics of protection 
underlying both RtoP and the EU’s migration and asylum policy primarily entail a solidarity 
with, and a bolstering of, the sovereign capacity of the modern state. Neither Europe’s ethos 
nor RtoP can therefore provide the firm ethical grounds from which to build a deeper 
commitment to the protection of the figure most clearly failed by modern states—the refugee. 
My argument proceeds in three sections. First, I draw out the way the EU has 
constructed itself as an actor defined by a set of values that would appear to provide sure 
ethical footing when dealing with the current crisis. Interestingly, this has not led to an 
engagement with RtoP, which is weak in defining a role for regional organizations such as 
the EU. The second section therefore explores how, despite this mutual ignorance, there are 
substantial similarities between Europe’s politics of protection and the second “pillar” of 
RtoP—the responsibility of the international community to encourage and assist individual 
states in meeting their own responsibility to protect. Europe’s most successful protection 
policy, enlargement, operates as a highly evolved form of pillar two, building the all-round 
capacities and liberal values of potentially unstable states. Section three of this article turns to 
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how this politics of protection has played out in the current crisis. While the Common 
European Asylum System was meant to create Europe as an “area of protection” based on 
shared values and solidarity, the overwhelming focus has been on its “external dimension,” 
namely, strengthening the sovereign capabilities of third countries. Through pillar two–style 
policies, such as Regional Protection Programs and deals similar to the one struck with 
Turkey, European protection finds itself caught between the subjects of its solidarity—that is, 
a solidarity between member states, a solidarity with third countries, and a solidarity with 
refugees. The residual protection offered to refugees is the outworking of this ethical crisis. 
 
EUROPE’S PROTECTIVE ETHOS 
 
Europe’s current tribulations are particularly notable because it is common for the EU to be 
spoken of as a peculiarly normative or ethical actor;7 it is even more customary for European 
Commissioners to define it as such.8 This ethos is formalized in Article 2 of the post-Lisbon 
Treaty on European Union (TEU):  
 
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the 
rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These 
values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, 
tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail. 
 
This claim to being “founded” on liberal values requires interpretive work. As I note 
elsewhere,9 there is no mention of such a foundation in the Treaty of Paris (1951) or the 
Treaty of Rome (1957), which established the earliest precursors to the EU (the European 
Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community, respectively). Even the 
original TEU (1992), negotiated at Maastricht, only declares an “attachment” to some of 
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these “principles” in its preamble. The foundational role for “principles” was actually 
formalized in the Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999. Significantly, this 
revision of the TEU also granted the EU specific competence in immigration and asylum 
policy, allowing the creation of laws in this area via the supranational “community method” 
and starting the move toward a Common European Asylum System. Thus, the idea of the EU 
as having been founded on the above values and the development of immigration and asylum 
policy were institutionalized at the same time.  
There is, as Andrew Williams notes, something curiously inept about this 
identification of a range of undefined principles and values that are then cast as a post hoc 
basis for the Union. Nonetheless, he also argues that with Lisbon there is “a clear and 
concerted attempt to enshrine constitutionally a notion of the ‘good’ for Europe that is sought 
through the EU.”10 The values express an ethos of the EU as an institution, or a set of 
institutions. Jacques Derrida defines an “ethos” as a culture, a way of being and dwelling in 
relation to oneself and others.11 And this is precisely what Lisbon sought to formalize—a way 
of relating both to the collective self through values that are common to institutions and 
member states, but also to the rest of the world. The post-Lisbon TEU thus underlines that 
one of the Union’s central aims is to “promote” these “values” (Article 3 (1)), both at home 
and in “its relations with the wider world” by contributing to “peace, security,” and other 
social goods, including “solidarity and mutual respect among peoples” (Article 3 (5)). The 
EU’s ethos is therefore not solely communitarian; it expresses a cosmopolitan solidarity with 
non-Europeans. As Catherine Ashton, the first post-Lisbon High Representative for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy, noted in 2010, the EU’s external relations are built on its basic 
values: “They are the silver thread running through all that we do.”12 
While protection is not one of the core values encapsulated in these listings, the EU’s 
ethos is nonetheless always directed toward protection, both internally and externally. The 
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commitment to forming a common immigration and asylum policy in 1999 was firmed up at 
the Tampere European Council that year as part of a drive to create a European space based 
explicitly on common values—a single “area of freedom, security and justice” (the AFSJ—a 
suite of policies to ensure free movement for EU citizens while maintaining their entitlements 
to justice, rights, and security) with border-free movement guaranteed by the 1985 Schengen 
Agreement.13 While the AFSJ was primarily oriented toward EU citizens, protecting their 
rights to move and work freely and access justice in a secure environment, it was recognized 
by the Tampere European Council that “it would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions 
to deny such freedom to those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to 
our territory.”14 Thus, the building of a Common European Asylum System (CEAS) became 
necessary. There followed three five-year programs (Tampere, 1999; The Hague, 2005; and 
Stockholm, 2010) that worked toward the AFSJ and its CEAS. A key priority of the 
Stockholm program was building a “Europe that protects” its citizens and their common 
values via a comprehensive internal security strategy.15 Concomitantly, the aim of the CEAS 
was for Europe to become a “common area of protection and solidarity” for non-EU citizens 
seeking international protection.16 The Commission’s 2015 European Agenda on Migration 
therefore speaks of the CEAS as an enactment of its “duty to protect,” guarding the lives and 
fundamental rights of asylum seekers.17 
It is thus not surprising that the EU does not explicitly use the language of RtoP in 
relation to refugees, migrants, or asylum seekers within its ethics and politics of protection. 
After all, it already has a system of cosmopolitan values in place; protection is merely an 
outworking of these values. Perhaps more importantly, the emerging norm of RtoP, whatever 
its future potential, is currently redundant in this area: it contains no requirements for states or 
regional organizations to welcome refugees from other territories. The original International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty report introducing RtoP only mentions 
 7 
 
refugee “flows” as a reason why national interest may be mobilized to intervene in conflict 
situations,18 and refugee repatriation and resettlement as a problem of post-conflict protection 
within the territory concerned.19 It contains no responsibility to welcome refugees, a subject 
that is already catered for by international humanitarian and refugee law. Alex Bellamy 
recently argued that for RtoP to be truly effective it requires the full implementation of 
international refugee law (the 1951 Convention on the Protection of Refugees, the 1967 
Protocol, and especially the principle of “non-refoulement,” which forbids the return of those 
seeking asylum to their place of persecution), though he notes that these international refugee 
laws are “already established.”20 And yet the 2005 UN World Summit Outcome document, in 
which the United Nations formally accepted that each state has a “responsibility to protect its 
populations” from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, 
makes no explicit reference to refugees.21 The UN Secretary-General’s 2009 report on RtoP’s 
implementation mentions the protection of refugees as a goal “relating to the responsibility to 
protect,” but offers no detail on this relation.22 The 2014 report does include a paragraph on 
the protection of refugees and internally displaced persons, though responsibility for their 
protection is placed solely with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) working alongside 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).23 
Thus, RtoP cannot help the EU deal with the current crisis without a significant 
extension of its meaning and remit. Given the reluctance of Western states to resettle refugees 
even in what are extreme present circumstances, such a major augmentation is extremely 
unlikely in the near future. Meanwhile, this expansion would also be unnecessary because of 
long-standing international legal provision in the area. As Emma Haddad observes, though 
the international community’s responsibility to intervene when a sovereign state is failing to 
protect its citizens remains contested, “that duty is quite clear and unequivocal when those 
people have crossed an international border.”24 If the EU and its member states are content to 
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show a “disturbing disregard for international law covering the rights of refugees, asylum 
seekers, and migrants” in their recent deal with Turkey,25 breaking with an emerging norm 
would seem to prove little obstacle. Nonetheless, this raises a wider issue about the EU’s 
ambivalence concerning RtoP. Despite formal declarations backing RtoP, “overt support for 
and actual implementation of the RtoP notion has been slow to emerge within the Union 
itself.”26 The next section draws out this inconsistency as part of a deeper parallel between 
the EU’s and RtoP’s politics of protection: both offer a minimalist protection of the 
individual amid a more maximalist defense and reinforcement of the state.  
 
PARALLEL PROTECTION: EU, RTOP AND THE STATE 
 
Ian Manners has stressed that part of what makes the EU a “normative power” is that the 
norms and values it embodies and endorses seek to shift the practice of international politics 
beyond “the bounded expectations of state-centricity.”27 For some, this means that “one 
would expect it, prima facie, to welcome a norm-redefining state sovereignty such as R2P.”28 
In fact, the EU has been inconsistent in its backing of RtoP. While it initially welcomed the 
UN Summit Outcome and its endorsement of the principle in 2005, EU pledges of support 
have since been rather patchy, with little action on a consistent interpretation or 
implementation in its conflict prevention policies.29 Put in constructivist terms, the EU has 
accepted but not yet internalized RtoP as an emerging norm.30 Scholars have offered many 
reasons for this apparent failure—from a lack of coordination, clear strategy, and political 
will to commit the necessary means for protecting people outside its borders,31 to a 
disagreement between the strategic cultures of influential member states.32 It is not my 
concern to explain the EU’s ambivalence with respect to RtoP. Rather, this section is 
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interested in how the EU and RtoP offer similar, parallel forms of protection that, far from 
shifting focus away from the state, actually make it the primary target of their protection. 
Part of the problem for finding the EU’s place within RtoP has been the latter’s lack 
of detail and specification regarding the role of regional organizations. RtoP generally has 
three relevant subjects of address: the state, whose sovereignty is redefined as involving 
responsibilities of protection against the four crimes noted in pillar one; the populations 
residing in that state’s territory to whom such responsibilities are owed; and the international 
community, represented by member states of the United Nations, to which responsibilities are 
passed if any state fails to fulfill them. In terms of the three pillars of RtoP laid out in the 
Secretary-General’s 2009 implementation report, the state is the relevant protection-giving 
subject of pillar one (the protection responsibilities of the state) and member states acting 
through the UN are the relevant subjects of pillar three (timely and decisive response). The 
subject of pillar two (international assistance and capacity-building’) is the “international 
community,” whose role it becomes to help states achieve their responsibilities under pillar 
one. It is here we find reference to the role of regional arrangements, but only to the extent 
that the international community can draw on their cooperation alongside states, subregional 
arrangements, civil society, the private sector, and the wider UN system.33 Regional 
organizations become just one of many actors to encourage and help states meet their 
responsibilities through building their protection capacity and assisting their efforts.34 By way 
of example, the EU-led “Operation Artemis” in the Democratic Republic of the Congo is 
mentioned alongside efforts elsewhere by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the Economic Community of West African States, the United Kingdom, and UN 
peacekeeping operations.35 While regional organizations may have a role in pillar three, this 
is primarily in “non-coercive and non-violent response measures”;36 their coercive actions 
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must have the “prior authorization of the Security Council,” as must their use of “targeted 
sanctions.”37  
Regional participation in all three pillars is fleshed out slightly in the Secretary-
General’s 2011 report on RtoP’s implementation. The role of regional organizations, such as 
the EU, is merely one of bringing “added value” to each pillar:38 collaborating with UN 
agencies on encouraging governments to meet their responsibilities; providing training, 
education, and awareness-raising; undertaking early-warning and fact-finding research 
alongside quiet diplomacy and mediation; developing norms and standards to promote 
tolerance and accountability; and serving as conduits for the timely flow of accurate 
information. Regional participation therefore remains underspecified. The EU is also rarely 
mentioned, in part because the stress is put on the proximity (both cultural and geographical) 
of regional organizations to conflict-affected societies, which allows them a particular 
legitimacy in certain contexts.39 As few atrocity crimes take place near the EU, its RtoP role 
is automatically minimized. However, the one area in which the EU is mentioned in slightly 
more substantive terms is its policy of enlargement: “Through initiatives to stem 
discrimination and xenophobia and its rigorous standards for membership accession, the 
European Union helps to discourage conditions that could breed atrocity crimes.”40 Indeed, 
this is cited twice, as “the requirements for entry into the European Union may also be 
helpful in encouraging countries to meet human rights standards.”41 Oddly, while the former 
is raised under pillar one, the latter emerges as part of pillar three, though entry requirements 
can hardly be seen as a “timely and decisive response.” 
Regardless of which pillar entry requirements fall under (most obviously one or two), 
Geert De Baere endorses the Secretary-General’s reading in his own analysis: 
 
He thus appears to regard EU enlargement as its greatest contribution to R2P. That may be quite an 
accurate observation. The EU too was set up as a means for tackling a situation of states that did not 
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manage to guarantee the safety of their population, which implied a loss of sovereignty. It is perhaps 
the most successful example of conflict prevention and of the rebuilding of broken states after 
conflict.42 
 
European Commissioners have frequently agreed with this assessment. Former Enlargement 
Commissioner Štefan Füle reflected that not only has enlargement historically been the EU’s 
most successful security policy, it is now bringing “peace, stability, and prosperity” to the 
Western Balkans. In his words, “The prospect of EU membership for these countries plays a 
key role in the process of their reconciliation,” as demonstrated by the recent dialogue 
between Serbia and Kosovo.43  
However, the EU’s enlargement policy and its requirements for entry—seen by the 
Secretary-General as the EU’s greatest contribution to RtoP—have never at any time referred 
to RtoP. Enlargement predates RtoP by several decades, beginning in 1973 when the 
European Community welcomed in Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom. The process 
of enlarging the EU as such began in the early 1990s as its institutions wrestled with the need 
for a coherent position in relation to newly liberated Central and Eastern European countries. 
The first set of coherent “requirements for entry” thus emerged in 1993, with the so-called 
Copenhagen Criteria. These referred not to any kind of responsibility to protect but to the 
European values that would later become the post hoc foundation of the EU. A candidate 
country must have achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, 
human rights, and respect for and protection of minorities.”44 These principles are now 
enshrined within the post-Lisbon TEU, with Article 49 establishing the basis for enlargement 
as “Any European State which respects the values referred to in Article 2 and is committed to 
promoting them may apply to become a member of the Union.”  
The EU’s entry requirements aim at something much wider and deeper than 
protecting populations from mass atrocity crimes. They seek to institutionally guarantee a 
 12 
 
whole range of liberal-democratic values and principles that make up the ethos of the EU. As 
such, their implementation is a long and highly bureaucratic process. Once a state applies to 
join the EU, its fulfillment of the Copenhagen Criteria is considered by the Commission 
before the European Council decides whether to make them a candidate. Additional criteria 
can then be set before negotiations begin. For the Western Balkan countries this has included 
the signing and implementation of Stabilisation and Association Agreements, which 
contained general requirements (for example, setting up a free trade area) as well as more 
specific issues, such as the return of refugees and compliance with the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. A screening process then begins, in which the 
Commission decides the candidate’s deficiencies in relation to the obligations of membership 
and the acquis communautaire (the body of EU law). The acquis is split into thirty-five 
chapters, each of which must be negotiated separately and contain benchmarks to be reached 
before new chapters are opened.45 
The aim of these entry requirements is not then primarily to protect populations, but 
to completely transform the candidate states into modern, liberal democracies. It is an 
exercise of what Enlargement Commissioners call the EU’s “transformative power.”46 The 
experience helped to transform Central and Eastern Europe into a set of “modern, well-
functioning democracies,” and that experience is now being transferred to the Western 
Balkans.47 When these unstable, atrocity-prone states accede, they too will thus be 
“transformed,” becoming “stable, secure, well-governed, and prosperous . . . fully part of the 
European mainstream.”48 In this way the enlargement process can be seen as a highly 
evolved, heavily bureaucratized and invasive version of pillar two capacity-building: 
encouraging and helping states through advice, rule of law requirements, and financial help to 
peacefully and permanently resolve conflict via tolerance and democracy. In particularly 
recalcitrant and vulnerable states, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, without centralized 
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authority or capacity, this has involved not just institution-building but outright “member 
state-building,” as the EU seeks to change the constitution and the structure of the 
government from the ground up.49  
In this sense, the EU’s entry requirements are not primarily targeted at protecting the 
populations of its neighboring states; rather, they aim to protect both the EU itself from 
instability on its borders, as well as its neighboring states by building their strength and 
capacity. The protection of populations is a beneficial and non-incidental by-product. This 
was revealed most clearly when the EU, as part of the Stabilisation and Association process, 
demanded that the hyperdecentralized federal structure of Bosnia be reformulated on the 
basis of a stronger central state and an end to the Office of the High Representative (leftover 
from the Dayton peace accords). This was democratically rejected by the Bosnian Serb 
Republika Srpska (RS) and generated renewed calls for RS secession. The EU’s response was 
that secession, whether or not it was the democratically expressed will of the population, was 
something it would “never accept.”50 This stance makes sense if we understand EU entrance 
requirements as being first and foremost about protecting the EU and its neighboring states. 
Although the EU’s entry requirements may appear contrary to the spirit of RtoP, the 
two in fact share the same underlying logic. State protection is also central for RtoP. In both 
the 2005 World Summit declaration and the 2009 RtoP implementation report, the Secretary-
General stressed that “the responsibility to protect is an ally of sovereignty, not an adversary. 
. . . By helping states to meet their core protection responsibilities, the responsibility to 
protect seeks to strengthen sovereignty, not weaken it. It seeks to help states succeed, not just 
react when they fail.”51 This is also emphasized in the 2011 report, which notes that the “core 
function” of both global and regional organizations is to “permit the full and peaceful 
expression of sovereignty within the purposes and principles of the Charter.”52 The desire to 
reinforce state sovereignty is essential to UN Special Adviser Jennifer Welsh’s emphasis on 
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pillar two over pillar three.53 The Secretary-General’s 2014 report on pillar two underlines its 
intent to “reinforce, not undermine, sovereignty” as it “reaffirms the fundamental principle of 
sovereign equality” between states.54 
While certainly seeking to strengthen the protection of populations, the narrow 
approach to RtoP adopted by the UN—focusing only on preventing the four crimes of 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity—severely limits its 
scope.55 In contrast, the stress on pillars one and two, and the noncoercive aspects of pillar 
three, offer a wide and thorough form of protection to the state, its sovereignty, and its 
centrality. This is hardly surprising, as conflict intervention literature has long noted the 
necessity of restoring “legitimate and functioning order and authority” as well as stopping 
atrocities; the latter is unsustainable without the former.56 What RtoP offers suffering 
populations and individuals then is the minimalist protection that characterizes 
humanitarianism,57 as opposed to the maximalist protection offered to the state. And this is a 
protective logic shared by the EU, both in its enlargement policy (see above) and in its 
immigration and asylum arrangements. 
 
SOLIDARITY AND OUTSOURCED PROTECTION 
 
The first two sections of this article have argued that not only does RtoP currently fail to offer 
ethical guidance on the EU’s treatment of refugees because it contains no requirement to 
grant asylum, but also it replicates, in a much narrower fashion, much of what the EU already 
does through its founding values and enlargement policy. Despite their state-challenging 
appearance, both the EU and RtoP concentrate their protection on the state rather than on 
suffering populations. This final section explores how this helps us understand the EU’s 
politics of protection regarding refugees and migrants specifically. It finds that Europe as a 
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“common area of protection,” as promised by the AFSJ and CEAS, operates less by 
welcoming refugees and more by outsourcing its protection to spaces beyond the EU’s 
member states. And it does so precisely in the terms advocated by RtoP: “assistance and 
capacity-building.” Rather than bettering the EU’s protection mechanisms, RtoP effectively 
authorizes its current treatment of refugees. 
As mentioned in the first section above, the EU as a common area of protection has 
been developed on the basis of its shared values, without reference to RtoP. The value most 
often stressed in relation to the CEAS has been that of solidarity, through a sharing of 
responsibility. To this end, the Tampere Programme (1999–2004) concentrated on 
harmonizing the legal frameworks of EU member states around minimum standards.58 The 
Hague Programme (2005–2009) set up the second phase, which included the establishment of 
a common asylum procedure and uniform status for those granted protection, as well as an 
appeal to member states to fully implement the first phase.59 The second phase also stressed 
the “external dimension” of asylum policy.60 This external dimension is founded on 
partnership with third countries, especially those that produce and transit refugees, assisting 
them in “their efforts to improve their capacity for migration management and refugee 
protection,” as well as preventing illegal migration, helping to provide durable solutions, 
building border-control capacity, and tackling the problem of return.61 It aimed to develop 
pillar two–style policies of capacity-building and assistance, tying them into development and 
humanitarian policy, but also into the policing of borders—combating illegal migration and 
facilitating the return of failed asylum seekers. The external dimension would both protect 
refugees and police their movement.  
This was underlined in the Stockholm Programme (2010–2014), which recognized 
that the CEAS must not stop at internal EU solidarity and mere partnership with third 
countries: 
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Promoting solidarity within the EU is crucial but not sufficient to achieve a credible and sustainable 
common asylum policy. It is therefore important to further develop instruments to express solidarity 
with third countries in order to promote and help build capacity to handle migratory flows and 
protracted refugee situations in these countries.62 
 
Thus the “external dimension” of European protection sought to express “solidarity” with 
third countries by augmenting them, “particularly their capacity to provide effective 
protection.” Notice that the Council here is not expressing solidarity with refugees 
themselves, those in need of international protection, but only with third countries. In 
contrast, the Commission’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, the overarching 
framework within which the external dimension of immigration and asylum policy is 
organized, emphasizes a need to “enhance solidarity with refugees and displaced persons.”63 
The EU thus seems at odds with itself over precisely who is the subject of its solidarity.  
The specific solidarity policies mentioned by both Council and Commission are 
Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), developed by the Commission from 2005.64 The 
Council’s solidarity also involves an attempt to “encourage the voluntary participation” of 
EU member states in an EU resettlement scheme for bona fide refugees trapped outside its 
borders.65 However, this hospitable protection of refugees remains voluntary. The stress is 
thus laid on the external dimension remaining external, delivering European protection 
elsewhere by outsourcing it.66 RPPs are the primary mechanism for this outsourcing, 
financing UNHCR and NGO projects from existing EU funds to do two things: build 
protection capacity in these problem regions and promote durable solutions (repatriation, 
resettlement, or integration) in regions that produce and transit refugees. Relating to the latter, 
RPPs include a resettlement commitment from EU member states, though like the wider 
external dimension this is on a voluntary basis and therefore commits to little.67  
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The first two Regional Protection Programmes targeted Eastern Europe as a transit 
region (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine) and the African Great Lakes region (specifically 
Tanzania) as a region of origin. A further two followed in 2010 covering the Horn of Africa 
(Djibouti, Kenya, and Yemen) and northeast Africa (Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia). The 
Commission announced in 2013 that a new Regional Protection and Development 
Programme (RPDP) for Syrian refugees would cover Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.68 Although 
the EU does not refer to RPPs explicitly in terms of RtoP, as Haddad notes they are almost 
the definition of what one might expect from pillar two with regard to external refugee 
protection.69 They are a matter of collaborating with and funding UNHCR in encouraging 
governments and their agencies to meet their responsibilities; providing government training 
and education on border controls and protection issues and procedures; and developing norms 
and standards to promote compliance with international refugee law.70 They are thus about 
the delivery of European protection to external spaces, and RPPs now surround the EU’s 
problematic borders to the south and east.  
The actual projects funded by Regional Protection Programmes are too numerous and 
diffuse to list. It is also difficult to do so as, despite frequent references made to them by the 
Commission and Council, their details remain vague and project reports are not available to 
the public. Aspasia Papadopoulou was granted access to UNHCR and Commission archives 
to research and assess the concept and implementation of RPPs, and as such she provides an 
invaluable summary.71 Papadopoulou found that each of the regional projects was beset by 
particular contextual problems, but all suffered from a lack of coordination, funding, 
visibility, understanding, and engagement. In providing funding for classic UNHCR services, 
RPP projects have “contributed to the overall improvement of conditions” for refugees and 
national authorities. However, this way of operating also makes it unclear “how far RPPs are 
really additional to or different to regular UNHCR projects.”72 
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 In spite of their limited success, it is clear that Regional Protection Programmes have 
at their core the protection of refugees through the strengthening of state capacities. Yet, like 
the wider “external dimension” of the CEAS, they also encompass attempts to control 
refugee populations. Commissioner Franco Frattini, whose Justice, Freedom, and Security 
portfolio included the AFSJ and CEAS, noted this dual purpose when introducing RPPs in 
2005. As he explained, they aim to ensure that those who need protection are able to access it 
“as quickly as possible and as closely as possible to their needs”; but they also seek to 
“prevent illegal secondary movements.”73 The Commission confirms that RPP protection 
includes agreement with third countries on “roles and responsibilities” regarding “irregular 
second movement situations.”74 RPPs’ strengthening of third countries’ registration, border 
controls, and protection capacities is therefore also about preventing movements that may 
bring refugees closer to Europe. They are as much about protecting the EU member states 
from a confrontation with the other as they are about protecting the other. It is hardly 
surprising then that the weakest aspect of RPPs has been their resettlement commitment, as 
the numbers resettled to member states through RPPs are very small.75 This is clear if we 
look at the first two RPPs. While 12,471 refugees in Tanzania were welcomed by Australia, 
Canada, and the United States between 2004 and 2008, EU member states accepted just 434. 
In the same period, only 204 refugees were resettled from the Eastern European RPP to 
member states.76 Even in these cases, RPPs’ lack of visibility made it impossible to tell 
whether resettlement could be attributed to an RPP or to existing conventional cooperation 
with UNHCR programs.77 In this situation, it is no wonder that so many refugees have used 
traffickers to facilitate their secondary movements. As Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström noted in 2014, for asylum seekers “there are basically no legal ways to get to 
Europe.”78 
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The ethos that the EU expresses through its protection of refugees then diminishes in 
concentric circles of solidarity: greatest solidarity is expressed between member states by 
emphasizing the external dimension of protection; a secondary solidarity is directed toward 
third countries by strengthening their capacities to protect refugee populations and control 
their borders. It is only a tertiary, minimalist or humanitarian solidarity that encompasses 
refugees through a protective politics of care and control. The care of refugees is made 
dependent on their willingness to be controlled, refraining from movement toward the EU. 
These circles of responsibility do, however, inevitably clash, and a hint of this was visible 
above in the disagreement between the Council and Commission over whether third countries 
or refugees were the subject of solidarity. More visibly, this has been evident in conflicts 
between member states. Germany sought to express a greater solidarity with refugees in 
September 2015, opening its borders to undocumented migrants and allowing somewhere 
from three thousand to seven thousand to arrive in Munich in one day. This provoked a very 
public spat with the Hungarian Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, as Germany’s hospitality 
effectively turned Hungary into a transit state for those making the illegal movements the EU 
was trying to prevent. Meanwhile, Angela Merkel tried to use the praise she received from 
civil society to pressure other member states into accepting relocation and resettlement 
quotas. The attempt largely failed, however, as German border controls were reimposed 
within eight days and Hungary erected a razor-wire fence along its border with Serbia to stop 
further arrivals.79  
Although Germany’s capitulation could be interpreted as the EU reneging on its 
cosmopolitan values, this case is far from clear. If such values are to be expressed first in 
solidarity with other EU member states and only third and minimally (through outsourcing) 
with refugees, it is Hungary rather than Germany that was acting more in line with the 
European ethos. And crucially, this form of diminishing solidarity cannot be criticized using 
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the emerging norm of RtoP. In fact, it is authorized and legitimized by RtoP, which, in its 
present incarnation, is based on a maximalist defense of state sovereignty and a minimalist 
protection of populations. In fact, with the evolution of the RPP concept into the RPDP for 
Syrian refugees, the EU is offering far more than what is required by RtoP’s minimalism. The 
RPDP has provided greater funding and coherence than RPPs by directly linking protection 
to humanitarianism and socioeconomic development as part of a long-term perspective 
managed by the Danish government.80 While this may appear a stronger articulation of the 
EU’s secondary and tertiary solidarity, resettlement is no longer part of the package; it is 
handed over entirely to the UNHCR.  
The EU further stepped up its outsourcing of protection in November 2015 when it 
reached agreement with African leaders at Valletta on an EU Emergency Trust Fund for 
Africa. This fund of over €1.8 billion in development aid for states in the regions of North 
Africa, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and Lake Chad encompasses and goes beyond the 
regions already dealt with by RPPs. Accessing this funding will depend on agreed upon 
projects that address “the root causes of irregular migration” and promote “economic 
opportunities, security, and development.”81 The majority of the north of Africa is thereby 
incorporated within a giant RPDP, strengthening African states so as better to protect and 
contain actual or potential displaced populations.  
It is the 2016 Turkish deal, however, that best demonstrates the entanglement of both 
solidarity policies related to RtoP discussed in this article: (1) entry requirements for EU 
membership and (2) the external dimension of immigration and asylum policy. What the EU 
received from the deal was a reinforced role for Turkey in its external dimension. Turkey 
agreed that all new “irregular migrants”—even those from recognized conflict zones such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria—arriving in Greece from March 20 onward would be deported 
back to Turkey.82 The government would also commit to taking “any necessary measures” to 
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prevent further illegal migration. For every Syrian returned, a legally recognized and 
UNHCR-verified Syrian refugee would be resettled from Turkey’s camps into the EU. No 
such commitment is offered for any other nationality. This will not necessarily involve any 
greater commitment from the EU, as it would initially use up the remaining 18,000 places of 
the resettlement scheme agreed to by member states in July 2015. Beyond that, any new 
resettlements would be based on voluntary commitments by member states up to a maximum 
of 54,000. Thus, in keeping with the prioritization of the external dimension of immigration 
and asylum policy, the EU’s own resettlement commitment is the deal’s weakest element. 
In return, Turkey received an accelerated move toward visa liberalization, which was 
meant to include the lifting of visa requirements for Turkish citizens entering the Schengen 
area before June 2016. In reality this has been delayed, as the EU claimed Turkey failed to 
meet the border security and fundamental rights conditions, enraging the Turkish 
government, which has threatened to tear up the deal. There was, however, a hastened 
disbursement of the €3 billion already allocated under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey to 
improve the protection, education, healthcare, infrastructure, and living conditions of 
refugees; and the EU has committed to providing a further €3 billion before 2018. Most 
interestingly, Turkey received the EU’s promise to “reenergize” its accession process, 
opening new chapters of the acquis for negotiation and reopening previously frozen chapters. 
Even when the deal was signed, many of the Copenhagen Criteria—which were so crucial in 
institutionalizing the ethos of the EU around democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
the protection of minorities—were under threat in Turkey. Following the failed coup in July 
2016, this situation only worsened. Nonetheless, the EU not only designated Turkey a “safe 
third country” but also initially furthered its progress toward full EU protection as a future 
member state by opening Chapter 33 (Financial and Budgetary Provisions) of the acquis for 
negotiation. However, on November 24 the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly to 
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suspend the accession process due to concerns over human rights and the rule of law in 
Turkey.  
Criticism of the EU regarding this deal has, in large part, focused on whether or not 
Turkey can be considered a safe third country, an issue underlined by the European 
Parliament’s recent vote. According to the EU Asylum Procedures Directive, accelerated 
return of irregular migrants to a third country depends upon that country being safe under the 
following definition: offering no risk of serious harm or threat on account of race, religion, 
nationality, social group, or political opinion; respecting the principle of non-refoulement; 
refraining from the use of torture and degrading treatment; and allowing the possibility for 
migrants to request refugee status.83 Human Rights Watch and others strongly question most 
of these criteria with respect to Turkey, particularly Turkey’s refusal to allow non-Europeans 
to request refugee status. The Afghans, Iraqis, and Syrians deported from Greece can all be 
refouled once they reach Turkey.84 However, all of the EU’s actions here are tied to its 
membership requirements, which the Secretary-General sees as the EU’s greatest 
implementation of RtoP. In September 2015 the Commission proposed a new regulation that 
established the “safe” status of Turkey, justified on the grounds that, like other candidate 
countries, it had been deemed to fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria.85  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
No matter how ethically questionable the EU’s politics of refugee protection remains, it is 
important to stress that RtoP as currently formulated offers no resources for criticizing the EU 
or helping it to revise its response. Not only has the EU already institutionalized a much 
deeper and wider set of values than those encompassed by RtoP, it also has greater 
experience in implementing them through its entry requirements. RtoP currently offers no 
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guidance for how a regional organization could act more appropriately or ethically. 
Furthermore, RtoP proposes no responsibility on the part of states or regional organizations to 
welcome refugees beyond the existing commitments prescribed by international law. 
However, when we examine RtoP alongside the EU’s entry requirements and outsourced 
asylum protection, we see that both operate via a similar underlying ethics of solidarity with 
states, which limits the potential of either to develop a responsibility to resettle refugees.86 
Both seek primarily to protect and strengthen the state, namely, its sovereignty and protection 
capacity, by securing the borders of wealthy states and reproducing a global migration regime 
that traps (and protects) people near conflict.87 This is what the EU is doing in Turkey by 
committing to €6 billion in funding by 2018 and hastening its advance toward EU 
membership. RtoP currently asks for considerably less. Indeed, perhaps we can say that 
instead of the RtoP norm evolving to include a commitment to asylum, the EU’s more 
thoroughgoing solidarity with—and outsourcing of protection to—third countries is its more 
obvious evolution. In sum, perhaps the EU’s externalized politics of protection is the 
evolution of RtoP. 
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